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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
0.1 This report describes the statutory evaluation of the NHS Scotland health 
board electoral and alternative pilot projects, arising from the Health Boards 
(Membership and Elections) (Scotland) Act 2009. It should be read in 
conjunction with the accompanying literature review that presents relevant 
research findings and experience from around the world. 
0.2 Parliament’s declared legislative intent in passing the 2009 act was to 
increase local accountability and to address a perceived democratic deficit in 
wholly appointed Health Boards.  
0.3 Two NHS boards, Dumfries and Galloway and Fife held elections for 10 and 
12 members respectively. Two other boards, Grampian and Lothian explored 
alternative ways of recruiting and selecting 2 new appointed members each.  
0.4 This evaluation shows that it is possible to successfully hold direct elections 
for NHS health boards. Members of the public are prepared to stand in 
considerable numbers. The electoral turnout was low. In general, those who 
stood showed similar characteristics to those who were appointed under the 
existing system; they are middle aged or older, mainly male, white and 
professional. However amongst those elected, approximate gender balance 
was achieved. It also appears that in some cases, reasons for standing in 
elections differ from those generally seen as motivating the seeking of board 
appointment. Specifically, a number of candidates, including some who were 
successful, stood on electoral platforms that were clearly driven by 
contentious local issues, for example, planned hospital closure or transfer of 
services.  
0.5 This subsequently impacted the way board business was conducted. In one of 
the elected Boards, votes on issues became more common. Members were 
more likely to ask for their specific and sometimes dissenting contribution to 
be specifically recorded in the minutes. Dissenting opinions were more likely 
than previously to find their way into the press. By comparison, the impact of 
the alternative pilots was more subtle. This was probably a result of relatively 
few new members being introduced.  
0.6 The costs of mounting the elections for the two boards totalled £773,256. For 
a number of reasons, it is not easy to accurately predict the cost of holding 
elections on a national basis, but a reasonable minimum estimate would lie in 
the range of £11M to £12M.  Again the cost of rolling out the alternative pilots 
would be much smaller, about £224,000 per year, and £112,308 per 
appointment round, at 2010 prices.  
0.7 This report provides in its Conclusion and Summary section an explanation of 
the advantages and disadvantages of three possible ways forward in terms of 
filling non-executive positions.  
0.8 The current system has the advantage of being well understood, relatively 
cheap and allowing for the selection of individuals based on specific skills. 
However it is perceived as somewhat lacking local accountability and as being 
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responsible for generating boards that are not demographically 
representative.  
0.9 The alternative pilots demonstrate possible ways of partially addressing the 
perceived weaknesses of the current system. Specifically, a broader 
recruitment process which makes clear that interest is particularly welcome 
from those traditionally underrepresented on boards undoubtedly has 
something to contribute. However the existing selection process that then 
follows initial long list recruitment needs careful reassessment, and probably 
modification, if this approach is to be fully effective in addressing Parliament’s 
legislative intent. 
0.10 Finally, direct elections have both considerable advantages and drawbacks. 
They directly address issues of local democracy and accountability and thus 
have the potential to change the way boards function through increasing the 
level of challenge to Chairs, Chief Executives and indeed the Scottish 
Government. One counter argument is that elected boards may not be able to 
function as effective corporate entities. We saw no evidence of this during the 
pilot period. The electoral pilots attracted large numbers of candidates. The 
general public did not turn out in large numbers to vote although those who 
were older were more likely to vote. Voter turnout amongst 16 and 17 year 
olds was particularly low reflecting perhaps the novelty of this group being 
able to vote for the first time. Many electors claimed they had inadequate 
information about Health Board elections. Furthermore the literature suggests 
that turnout may fall in subsequent electoral rounds. The process is costly in 
comparison to the existing system (whether it continues as is, or is amended 
in line with the alternative pilots). However, it could be argued that even an 
estimated cost of £12M (incurred every four years) is relatively modest in 
comparison to the budget of NHS Scotland as a whole.  
 
0.11 The complex process of weighing these somewhat subjective factors means 
that the decision on which system to adopt is of necessity a political and 
parliamentary one rather than a technical one. However we hope our research 
findings will inform this decision by outlining the advantages and 
disadvantages of the different strategies and their costs (including the 
uncertainties surrounding those costs) as well as the possible impacts on the 
Boards, and resultant changes in the relationships between the Government, 
the Public and the NHS.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Scotland has enjoyed the benefits of a National Health Service (NHS) since 
1948. Throughout its existence the delegation of powers to geographically-
defined boards has been a key feature of its management arrangements. The 
exact number and function of these local entities has varied, with hospital and 
community services being run separately at times. However, by and large the 
Scottish NHS has been characterised by stability, integration and an 
adherence to the founding principles of the NHS. In recent years this 
adherence has included a reemphasis of the concept of mutuality. Long-
standing debates have continued around a number of issues. For example, 
there has been debate about how to balance a desire for local autonomy with 
the need to support rational regional planning. Governance arrangements 
have also come under scrutiny. Again, balance is a key issue with national 
imperatives and delegated managerial autonomy needing to be tempered with 
local community engagement and accountability. Central to achieving this 
balance is the way in which non-executive directors are selected/elected to 
boards.   
1.2 Until the 1990s, appointments to boards tended to be in the gift of the UK 
government of the day. From 1995, the Nolan Commission reported on 
standards in public life, in the first of a series of reports that would enunciate 
clear principles for public sector activity and transform public sector practices, 
including the selection of board members1
1.3 By 2010, the board of directors in each Health Board was made up of  
. Nolan principles and practices 
meant that nonexecutive directors had to be, among other things, selected on 
merit by panels with a substantial independent element (although ministers 
retained the ultimate power of appointment). Government and the public 
sector invested in formal appointment mechanisms designed to produce this 
independently validated, merit-based selection, including the Public 
Appointments Commissioner for Scotland and reformed mechanisms within 
boards for identifying merit and advertising board positions. In Scotland, 
‘unified boards of governance’ for NHS services were created in 2000, but it 
was with the 2004 dissolution of NHS Trusts and Primary Care Trusts that the 
current structure of unified territorial Boards emerged. The current 14 
territorial Boards have responsibility for the planning and delivery of almost all 
health care in their geographical areas, including public health. Whilst the 
2000 and 2004 changes returned NHS Scotland more closely to its traditional 
organisational arrangements, it did not address what some perceived as the 
“democratic deficit” inherent in appointed governmental bodies. The rest of 
this chapter describes the introduction of electoral and alternative pilots as a 
means of seeking to address issues of engagement and accountability. 
• Between five and nine non-executive lay members: appointed by the 
Cabinet Secretary for Health & Wellbeing in a process overseen by Office of 
the Commissioner for Public Appointments in Scotland (OCPAS)   
                                            
1 Available at http://www.public-standards.gov.uk/OurWork/Other_Reports_and_Research.html 
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• Non-executive stakeholder members: including a senior Councillor from 
each of the local authorities in the Board area; an Employee Director; the 
Chair of the Area Clinical Forum; and a University Medical School member 
(in the main teaching Health Boards) 
• Executive members: senior managers within the Health Board.  
1.4 The Health Boards (Membership and Elections) (Scotland) Act 20092
1.5 This commitment was made against the backdrop of a number of high profile 
campaigns against NHS service reconfigurations.   
 was 
introduced by the Scottish Government with the stated objective of improving 
public confidence in the health system. Prior to the 2007-11 Parliamentary 
session the Scottish National Party manifesto had contained a commitment to 
“Introduce direct elections to health boards” so that “at least half of health 
board members will be elected by the public.” 
1.6 The Christie Commission has suggested that enhancing public engagement 
and accountability should be a priority for Scotland’s public services3
1.7 The Health Boards (Membership and Elections) (Scotland) Act 2009 follows 
several other measures that have aimed to increase public involvement and 
accountability in NHS decision making. Measures introduced by previous 
administrations include a statutory duty for Boards to involve the public in 
decision-making, encouraging Boards to establish Public Partnership Forums, 
the inclusion of representatives of Local Councils on Boards, and establishing 
the Scottish Health Council to promote greater public involvement in the NHS 
and support NHS Boards in improving their patient and public participation. 
Since 2007, as part of the agenda for a mutual NHS, the Government has 
introduced its NHS Quality Strategy, which has a “person-centred” ambition,  
the Participation Standard against which Boards self-assess how well they are 
doing in meeting its three specific elements and increased opportunities for 
members of the public to ask questions at their Board’s Annual Review event.  
. The 
legislation that enabled these pilots makes direct reference to both.  
1.8 The Health Boards (Membership and Elections) (Scotland) Act introduced 
direct elections to the Health Boards. It did so by allowing the Scottish 
Government to pilot direct elections to two of the territorial Health Boards, 
namely NHS Dumfries and Galloway and NHS Fife. The Act and supporting 
regulations required that 
• Direct elections be held for new Non-Executive Directors 
• These new members, together with Councillors nominated by Local 
Authorities and appointed by Ministers, form the majority of the members on 
each Health Board. 
• All voting in the elections be postal 
• The elections use the Single Transferable Vote system and the whole of 
each Health Board area form a single electoral ward 
                                            
2Available at www.uk-legislation.hmso.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/acts2009/pdf/asp_20090005_en.pdf  
3 Available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/352649/0118638.pdf  
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• The franchise be extended to include 16 and 17 year olds in the pilot areas 
• Candidates’ campaign spending was limited to £250 each 
 
1.9 In effect, these rules meant that NHS Dumfries and Galloway needed ten new 
elected members while NHS Fife needed twelve. The appointment of the 
Chair of each Health Board would continue to be a Ministerial one following 
the standard public appointment process. The Health Boards would remain 
accountable to Ministers and be required to comply with regulations and 
Ministerial directions. 
1.10 Notices of election were to be published between the 15th and 22nd of April 
2010.  Members of the public were then able to put themselves forward as 
candidates for election until the 6th of May 2010. Candidates needed to live or 
work in the Board area, and a few senior NHS Executives and staff working 
closely with the Board were not able to seek election, but otherwise the 
eligibility criteria were similar to those for candidates for election to the 
Scottish Parliament or Local Councils. Between the 8th and 13th of May, 
Returning Officers in the pilot areas issued voting packs to eligible electors. 
The packs contained their ballot paper plus a booklet of 250-word candidate 
statements from each person seeking election.  The poll closed at 4pm on 10 
June 2010.  
1.11 During the passage of the bill, Scottish Ministers also agreed to two 
alternative pilot schemes. These were to attempt to enhance the existing 
public appointment processes and increase the diversity of candidates 
applying to become members of Health Boards without direct elections. The 
alternative pilots were assigned to NHS Grampian and NHS Lothian. These 
Boards were each given two new Non-Executive Director posts, and the 
number of Executive Directors who were formal members of the Board was to 
be reduced. The Boards were to be allowed to innovate in the recruitment of 
applicants for these new non-executive positions, but the selection process 
was to follow Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments in Scotland 
(OCPAS) guidelines. 
1.12 The Act stipulates that the pilots must be evaluated, and a report on the 
evaluation laid before Parliament, before any decisions can be taken on 
whether any of the pilots will be rolled out across Scotland. The evaluation 
was commissioned by the Scottish Government in January 2010 and 
undertaken by a consortium which included London School of Economics 
Enterprises and the University of St Andrews. This report summarises the 
evaluation methods and results.  
The report starts with a methods section (chapter 2) in which we lay out how 
we have responded to each of the aims of this statutory evaluation. In chapter 
3 we explore how the elected and alternative pilots worked in practice. 
Starting with the elected pilots we cover the demographics of candidates and 
those elected, review data on turnout rates including comparing it to general 
election rates. We also here detail the processes involved in the alternative 
pilots. Chapter 4 explores the costs of these pilot schemes and seeks to 
extrapolate to a national level should the parliament decide to proceed with 
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their more widespread introduction. Chapter 5 explores the impact that these 
pilots have had on the functioning of NHS boards. In chapter 6 we present 
suggestions for improving the pilots should they be rolled out and in chapter 7 
we conclude by looking at the relative advantages and disadvantages of each 
approach.  
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2 METHODS 
 
The Scottish Government set us eight objectives for this research.  
This section explains how we have addressed them. 
Statutory Aim 1: Assess the level of public participation in Health Board 
elections 
Candidate experiences 
2.1 We wrote to all candidates for the elections, in both Dumfries and Galloway 
and Fife, asking to arrange a short interview prior to the election. We 
interviewed all candidates who consented. We discussed their background 
and motives for seeking election, their experience of the election process, and 
their expectations about their role if they were to be elected.  
Voter turnout 
2.2 We selected a random sample of 6000 names from the electoral register, 
3000 from Fife and 3000 from Dumfries and Galloway. These samples 
represented roughly 1% and 2% of registered electors, respectively. We 
examined those electors’ behaviour in three ways. 
2.3 We sent a survey form to these electors’ registered addresses within a few 
days of the election, and followed up with two reminders if required. Our 
survey attracted a 31% response rate, which is a fair response for a survey of 
this type. The survey asked electors whether they had voted in the Health 
Board Elections, and the General Election for comparison, and why (or why 
not). It also asked how much information they had about the two elections, 
gauged their level of interest in the two elections, and collected data on age, 
sex, ethnicity, education, length of residence in the Board area, disability, 
carer status, dependent children, general health and contact with the NHS. All 
forms were marked with an identifying number which allowed us to link 
electors’ responses to their entry on the official marked register. 
2.4 We then examined the entries for those 6000 electors on the marked registers 
for both the Health Board Election and the General Election. The identifying 
numbers on the forms allowed us to link returned survey forms with 
postcodes, and by comparing these postcodes with the Scottish Index of 
Multiple Deprivation we were able to test whether the responses were coming 
disproportionately from members of the sample of 6000 who were living in 
affluent or deprived areas. This gave us an indication of how far respondents 
to our survey were representative of the population. Examining the marked 
registers also enabled us to identify respondents who had not recalled 
whether they voted or not accurately.     
2.5 Finally, we conducted in-depth interviews with 20 electors.  
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Young electors 
2.6 These were the first Scottish elections in which 16- and 17-year-olds were 
eligible to vote. Recognising that young electors’ experiences of the process 
might be distinctive, we paid particular attention to the views of 16- and 17-
year-olds. No respondents to our survey who fell into this category responded 
to our requests to arrange in-person interviews. We therefore contacted some 
members of youth organisations and arranged focus groups with students in 
appropriate schools and colleges. These focus groups probed students’ 
knowledge about the elections and views on how far they met the needs of 
young electors.  
2.7 A total of eight focus groups involving 59 pupils were conducted: three in two 
secondary schools in Fife and five in two secondary schools in Dumfries and 
Galloway. We chose the schools that we approached with the objective of 
maximising the difference between their catchment areas. In Fife this was an 
affluent catchment area, and a catchment area with significant levels of 
deprivation. In Dumfries & Galloway, groups were conducted in a town centre 
school and a rural school. Students were in 5th and 6th year, and between 16 
and 18 years old. Focus groups took place in class time, during the timetable 
slots allocated to Personal and Social Education or Modern Studies. Focus 
groups took place between November 2010 and February 2011. This was 
longer after the election than ideal, but delayed by the process of gaining 
ethical approval and agreement from schools.  
Statutory Aim 2: Assess whether having elected members on Health Boards 
led to increased engagement with patients and other members of the public or 
improved local accountability. 
Board interviews and observations 
2.8 Interviews with Board members were a key component of our research 
strategy. Existing members were clearly in a strong position to observe any 
changes in how the Board operated, including increased engagement and 
improved accountability. We explicitly raised the issue of the relationship 
between the Board and members of the public in our interviews. Newly 
elected members were asked about their behaviour since being elected to find 
out whether they related to the local population differently from other non-
executives in the past or their new colleagues. They were also asked 
specifically about what they perceived their relationship with the public to be, 
and to whom they saw themselves as accountable. 
2.9 We interviewed members of the pilot Health Boards before the elections to 
establish a clear picture of how each individual Board was operating at that 
point. We interviewed both Executive and continuing Non-Executive Directors 
after the elections had taken place to find out what they thought had changed, 
and we interviewed all elected members at least once. We eventually 
interviewed most of the members who were in place both before and after the 
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elections, and all the elected members4
2.10 We regularly observed public Health Board meetings, as well as private 
events such as committee business and development sessions by negotiation 
with the Board Chairs. These observations informed our interviews. 
. We also contacted key non-Board 
staff and stakeholders. 
2.11 In addition, we conducted selected interviews in Tayside Health Board to keep 
abreast of the kind of development in public and patient engagement taking 
place across the NHS.   
Media monitoring 
2.12 We reviewed press coverage of the pilot Boards between March 2010 and 
December 2011 to find out whether the pilots were having an impact on 
coverage. We used the NHS Scotland Media Monitoring database 
(www.media.scot.nhs.uk) to pick up coverage from the BBC, ITV, the national 
newspapers (the Sun, Daily Record, Scotsman, Herald, Daily Mail, etc.) and 
some of the local newspapers (the Courier, the Evening News, and the Press 
and Journal). This database also picks up some press releases from the 
Scottish Government and large charities. In both Dumfries and Galloway and 
Fife the local print media are highly fragmented, with many local newspapers 
covering individual communities. The media monitoring service does not 
cover these. We accessed print copies of these newspapers and made copies 
of articles that referred to the elections, discussed or quoted Board members, 
or raised issues that were relevant to our research.  
Statutory Aim 3: Estimate the cost of holding the pilot Health Board elections 
and the estimated cost of holding future Health Board elections in all Health 
Board areas 
2.13 We obtained figures for the costs of the pilots from the pilot Health Boards, 
the Dumfries and Galloway and Fife Returning Officers’ staff, and the Scottish 
Government Public Appointments Unit. We consulted with experienced 
Returning Officers’ staff, OCPAS assessors and civil servants for information 
on the details of election and public appointment processes and their cost 
implications. We have then estimated the cost of any national rollout based on 
the pilot figures. The details of our calculation are presented in the section on 
‘Costing’. 
Statutory Aim 4: Review existing research evidence on elected health boards 
from elsewhere and draw out implications for the development of pilots in 
Scotland 
2.14 We conducted a review of both academic and policy literature on elections to 
bodies analogous to territorial Health Boards in other jurisdictions. That review 
is being published alongside this report and contains its own methodology 
section. 
                                            
4 A small number of Board members had to be excluded due to their personal circumstances, such as 
absence or ill health, and we did give the option of not speaking with us to any members who felt 
uncomfortable. 
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Statutory Aim 5: Examine the process of implementation of, and arrangements 
for, the pilot health board elections  
2.15 We examined the voting materials and attended one of the counting sessions. 
We have examined media coverage of the Health Board elections, and 
interviewed Returning Officers’ staff to gather their views on the 
implementation of the elections. We also invited candidates in the elections, 
key staff of the Health Boards, stakeholders and a number of voters to 
discuss the election process in their interviews 
Statutory Aim 6: Impact of alternative pilots  
2.16 Our examination of the alternative pilots was broadly similar to our approach 
to the elections, apart from the analysis of the election process and results. 
We observed Health Board meetings, committees and development sessions 
both before and after the new members were appointed. We monitored media 
coverage of the alternative pilot Boards, and surveyed applicants for the new 
non-executive posts 5
Statutory Aims 7 and 8: Strengths and weaknesses, costs and benefits of both 
the pilots and alternative pilots and implications for future models of rollout of 
elections and models for public engagement and involvement in NHS 
Scotland. 
. We raised the issue of the alternative pilots with 
stakeholders. Perhaps most importantly, we arranged in-person interviews 
with existing members of these Boards to find out about any changes they 
had noticed over the course of the pilot, and interviewed the new members to 
find out about their personal experiences.   
2.17 We have prepared a summary of what our respondents have seen as the key 
strength and weaknesses, costs and benefits of the pilots in this report. As 
requested, we have also included respondents’ reflections on the execution of 
pilots so that, if Parliament does choose to roll out any of the pilots 
nationwide, improvements can be made based on past experience. We 
conclude by offering suggestions for improving the pilots. These are either 
ideas that were suggested to us during the course of our research and that we 
find plausible or they are ideas that arise from own experience and knowledge 
of the literature. 
 
                                            
5 We could not contact applicants before the selection process had concluded, and attempting to 
interview all applicants after they were notified that they had been rejected was not felt to be 
appropriate. We did interview a few unsuccessful applicants. 
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3 SELECTION OF CANDIDATES 
 
Elections 
We have considered what kinds of people put themselves forward as candidates, 
which potential voters actually took part in the election and who was eventually 
elected.  
Candidates 
3.1 70 people sought election to the Board of NHS Dumfries and Galloway, 60 to 
the Board of NHS Fife6
3.2 Our survey of candidates, to which 83 candidates (64%) responded, suggests 
that the demographics of the candidates were fairly similar in both Boards 
(Fig. 3.1). The candidates were overwhelmingly between 41 and 60 (36% of 
the total) or 61 and 80 (51.8% of the total). Dumfries and Galloway had one 
candidate who was over eighty, one under 19, and one between 19 and 40; 
Fife had five candidates aged between 19 and 40 but none over 80 or aged 
less than 19. 
. The ballot papers and candidate statements sent to 
electors were therefore unusually long.  
Figure 3.1: Age of candidates 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
18 or
under
19-40 41-60 61-80 81 or
over
Dumfries and
Galloway
Fife
 
3.3 Most candidates were long-established residents of their Health Board areas, 
with 88% reporting they had lived there for over five years. Our responses 
indicated 71.1% were male and 96% were white (which means two 
candidates did not give information and one, in Fife, was not white). Five 
candidates (6%) had a first language other than English. The geographical 
distribution of candidates is indicated on the map, figure 3.2. This figure is 
based on the addresses printed on the ballot paper and therefore includes all 
candidates and not only those who responded to surveys. 
 
                                            
6 Sadly, one candidate in Fife was killed in a traffic accident a few weeks before the election. 
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 Figure 3.2: Geographical distribution of candidates 
 
 
 
3.4 We interviewed every candidate who agreed to speak with us. While most 
were retired or semi-retired professionals or local politicians, applicants came 
from a range of different backgrounds.  
3.5 There was a reasonably large group among the candidates who had sought 
appointment to public bodies before, or who had considered public 
appointments before but had recently retired and only now had enough free 
time to take a non-executive position. However, our interviews also suggested 
that many of the people who put their names forward would not have sought 
appointment to the Board through the traditional OCPAS-monitored 
procedure. Many candidates were unaware that non-executive positions on 
Health Boards were normally filled by public advertisement, and some 
believed that all members had to be invited to join Boards. A few were simply 
deterred by the current application system or believed they would stand no 
chance of being selected. 
3.6 There was also variation in how candidates approached the elections. A few 
candidates, often those with experience in local politics, campaigned 
vigorously and used conventional tools such as pamphlets and door-to-door 
canvassing. However, most candidates did not campaign in this way and only 
a few reported receiving any support from political parties. The election was 
thus quite different from a local government election. Many candidates did not 
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take any measures to encourage others to vote for them besides writing a 
candidate statement for the booklet and answering any questions posed to 
them by acquaintances. Many others encouraged people they already knew 
to vote for them, but did not contact other members of the public. These 
candidates typically expected support from people who already knew them 
personally or by reputation. As their addresses were printed on the ballot 
papers, some also expected support from residents in their area who would 
want to vote for a local candidate.  
3.7 There were a few factors peculiar to Dumfries and Galloway. In particular, 
there was a perception in some rural areas that the Board intended to 
centralise services in the larger towns. Some candidates in rural areas of 
Dumfries and Galloway reported that opposition to centralisation motivated 
them. Candidates in rural areas were also concerned that elected members 
who lived in the town of Dumfries should not dominate the Board.    
3.8 Although many candidates were vague on the details of what a non-executive 
does on a Board of Governance, most seemed to appreciate the need to 
compromise with other members and to accept collective decisions after 
discussion and possibly voting (while formal votes of Health Board members 
are rare, many interviewees did seem to believe that votes would occur 
periodically). Despite concerns among some Board personnel and 
stakeholders that Non-Executive Directors with single-issue agendas (for 
example, opponents of local hospital closures) might refuse to compromise 
and obstruct Board business if they disagreed with a policy, most candidates 
presented themselves as willing to compromise if they found themselves in a 
minority.  
Patterns of voter turnout 
3.9 We obtained records of voter turnout in these elections from the Returning 
Officers. In Dumfries and Galloway, 22.6% of eligible electors voted in the 
Health Board election (returning 26,516 ballots). In Fife turnout was 13.9% 
(with 39,761 ballots returned). 
3.10 Official records include the postcodes of all eligible electors in the two Board 
areas. This enables us to check whether turnout was concentrated in 
particular postcode areas, and also to compare turnout in deprived postcodes 
with turnout in affluent areas.  
3.11 The percentage of electors who returned their ballot papers did vary 
significantly in different postcode areas in Dumfries and Galloway, as shown 
in the map below (3.3). 
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Figure 3.3: Turnout by postcode, Dumfries and Galloway 
 
 
 
3.12 There was no clear pattern in Fife, where turnout varied only within a 5% 
range between 10.6% in FK10 (around Kincardine) and 15.9% (around Elie).  
3.13 We also compared levels of turnout with postcodes’ rankings on the Scottish 
Index of Multiple Deprivation (SIMD) (see Figure 3.4). This Index ranks 
clusters of postcodes according to their level of deprivation, from 1 (most 
deprived) to 6505 (least deprived) and is used by the Scottish Government in 
service targeting. In the graph below, deprivation ranking reduces from left to 
right. The leftmost bars represent turnout in postcodes which fell into the 500 
most deprived clusters in Scotland, while the rightmost bars represent turnout 
in postcodes that fell in the 505 least-deprived clusters. The other bars 
represent turnout levels in postcodes falling into clusters ranked between the 
501st and 1000th most deprived, 1001st and 1500th most-deprived, and so 
on. Blue bars give the turnout in Dumfries and Galloway; green bars the 
turnout in Fife. These figures ignore any postal votes that were sent to 
addresses outside the Health Board area.   
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Figure 3.4: Deprivation and turnout, board elections 
 
 
3.14 In Fife there was no statistically significant relationship between the SIMD 
rank of a voter’s postcode and likelihood of voting in the Health Board 
election. Voters in deprived areas did appear to be less likely to vote in 
Dumfries and Galloway, but SIMD rank was an extremely weak predictor of 
likelihood of voting. The fact that this relationship appeared probably reflects 
the fact that turnout was very much higher than average in a few of the 
affluent areas of Dumfries and Galloway rather than electors in deprived 
areas being unwilling to participate. In general, it does not appear that 
residents of deprived postcodes were less likely to return their ballot papers.  
3.15 For comparison, the figure below (3.5) repeats the analysis for the 2010 
General Election, using a random sample of 3000 electors in each Board 
area7
 
. While turnout overall was much higher in the General Election, the 
results for the Health Board do not suggest that there was a dramatically 
greater difference between deprived and affluent postcodes in the Health 
Board election. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
7 General Election registers are marked by hand, so electors whose record was ambiguous were 
removed for this analysis. 
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Figure 3.5 Deprivation and turnout, general election 
 
Survey of elector results 
 
3.16 Our survey of electors in Dumfries and Galloway and Fife provided us with 
substantial demographic information about those who chose to vote, and not 
to vote, in the Health Board elections8
3.17 Our analysis of this data indicates that age is by far the strongest predictor of 
whether an elector would turn out to vote in the Health Board election. Older 
electors, especially over-60s, were much more likely to return a valid ballot 
paper than younger electors in both Fife and Dumfries and Galloway.  In 
. This goes beyond the information we 
were able to gather from official records, including information on gender, 
education and ethnicity. Because we found that there was a strong correlation 
between voting in the election and returning our survey, with voters much 
more likely to return surveys than non-voters, the figures reported here have 
been weighted to place increased emphasis on the responses given by non-
voters.  
                                            
8 Note that these figures will differ from those listed in our interim report. The interim was based on 
raw survey data. The figures reported here were generated through a time-consuming process of 
refining the raw data. We have cross-checked voting reports with the Returning Officers’ marked 
registers and used these to generate the statistical weighting applied to the survey responses. This 
compensates for the fact that respondents were more likely to have voted than the general 
population. The weighting should make the figures in this report more reflective of the true 
characteristics of voters and non-voters in the Health Board areas than figures derived from the raw 
data. 
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keeping with the pattern in the Returning Officers’ figures, presented above, 
we also found that those electors in Dumfries and Galloway who lived in 
certain postcode areas were significantly more likely to vote. We also asked 
about respondents’ length of residence within the Board area, sex, state of 
health, disability, whether the respondent was a carer, and whether they had 
dependent children, but we did not find that any of these characteristics 
significantly influenced the odds of voting in the Health Board election9
3.18 Based on our weighted survey results, it seems that an elector aged between 
60 and 80 was more than twice as likely to vote as an elector aged between 
18 and 40.   
. 
Health Board versus general election 
 
3.19 Our survey asked voters both about whether they turned out for the General 
Election held just before the Health Board election, as well as the Health 
Board poll itself. This allowed us to test whether the characteristics associated 
with not voting in the Health Board election simply cause people to be 
disengaged from politics, or whether some of these electors were particularly 
deterred by something about the Health Board election. 
3.20 Turnout in the Health Board election was much lower than in the General. 
Only a few of our respondents had voted for the Health Board but not in the 
General Election, and that group of respondents was too small for us to be 
confident about generalising from their characteristics. We did have many 
respondents whose records show had voted in the General Election but not 
the Health Board election10
3.21 Electors who voted in the General Election but abstained for the Health Board 
were likely to be under 60
, and we were able to compare their characteristics 
with those of respondents who had voted in both. 
11
                                            
9 As we noted in our interim report, we did find that electors in Fife who described themselves as 
having “no formal qualifications” were much more likely to have voted. We are now confident that this 
finding  represented a spurious relationship. Of 160 respondents who reported not having formal 
qualifications, 121 were over 60 and only three were under 40 (unweighted figures). Because over-
60s were much more likely to vote than under-40s, regardless of their qualifications, this created an 
illusion that electors without qualifications were more likely to vote. Given the pattern of responses 
overall, it does not seem likely the lacking formal qualifications explained people’s decision to vote. 
Similarly, an apparent relationship between being a regular patient and likelihood of voting in 
Dumfries & Galloway is complicated by the fact that older respondents were much more likely to vote 
and be regular patients. 
. Unsurprisingly given this age profile, they were 
also more likely to have dependent children, they were less likely to report 
that their lifestyles were “limited a lot” by disability, and on average they rated 
their health as better than respondents who voted in both elections. This 
reinforces our finding that older electors were particularly likely to vote in the 
Health Board election.  
10 Records showed 729 respondents had voted in only the General Election, but the figures reported 
in this section have weighted those responses to take into account that voters were more likely to 
reply to our survey. 
11 The analysis shows 49.6% were over 60 as opposed to 59.6% of respondents; this figure is based 
on weighted results rather than the actual numbers of responses. 
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3.22 We already know that there are certain characteristics that make people less 
likely to vote in elections generally. Turnout in the Health Board elections was 
not only affected by these characteristics, but was much more heavily skewed 
towards older electors. Compared to respondents who had voted only in the 
General Election, respondents who reported that they had voted for the 
Health Board as well were more likely to be over 60 and had characteristics 
associated with being older.  
3.23 The survey also revealed that, despite significant efforts by the Boards and 
Returning Officers to inform the local population about the Health Board 
Elections, many electors still felt ill informed about the elections. Table 3.1 
shows responses to our survey question “How well-informed did you feel 
about the Health Board election?” It shows that many electors in both areas 
felt poorly informed, although electors in Fife tended to be less informed than 
their counterparts in Dumfries and Galloway. 
 Table 3.1: Did electors feel informed: board elections 
 Dumfries and Galloway Fife 
“Not at all well informed”  27.1% 41.9% 
“Not very well informed” 39% 39.8% 
“Well informed” 29.4% 16.9% 
“Very well informed” 4.3% 1.4% 
 
3.24 Our survey form also offered respondents an opportunity to tell us why they 
had chosen to vote, or not to vote. When reviewing their responses we 
became aware that a significant proportion of non-voters were attributing their 
decision to limited information. We drew a random sample of 302 of the 
respondents to our survey who offered a reason for their not voting in the 
Health Board Election. Forty-six cited lack of information about the 
candidates, 6 lack of information about the role of Board members, and 48 a 
general lack of information about the election. Overall, a third of these voters 
attributed their decision not to vote to a lack of information. This suggests that 
electors’ perception that they lacked information reduced the level of turnout. 
With regard to those who offered positive reasons for voting it seemed to 
come down to a feeling that that is simply what one should do i.e. it is a 
positive act of citizenship to vote and with these individuals this applied to 
both health board and general elections.  
Timing 
3.25 It is likely that the timing of the elections had a significant impact on the 
process. The closing date for candidate registration coincided with polling in 
the General Election. The election campaign took place against the 
background of post-General Election coalition negotiations. Proximity to the 
General Election affected candidates’ experience. Several candidates who 
had past experience of campaigning for election mentioned that they had 
expected the first few days in which ballot papers were delivered would be the 
most fruitful for campaigning, but these coincided with the distraction of the 
General Election.  
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3.26 The coincidence between the Health Board and General Elections also raises 
counterfactual questions as to how campaigns for any future elections might 
differ if a rollout order is made. For example, while a few candidates did make 
use of political party labels there was relatively little activity by local branches 
of political parties in the Health Board elections. If this was partly a result of 
party members having focused their energies on the General Election 
campaign, it is possible that there could be greater mobilisation in any future 
elections. Therefore, while relatively few of the candidates campaigned as 
representatives of political parties this does not necessarily mean that the 
rules of the election discourage political parties from becoming involved. The 
relatively low level of partisan campaigning seems to have reflected 
inopportune timing of these elections from the point of view of party activists, 
coupled with self-restraint by political parties, which we cannot be certain 
would continue in the event of a national roll-out. 
3.27 It is also possible that electors might be more available to digest information 
about future elections that did not coincide with a major national contest.  
3.28 Electors were much less well informed about these elections than they were 
about the General Election. Comparing Table 3.1, derived from weighted 
responses to the question “How well-informed did you feel about the Health 
Board election?” with Table 3.2 shows the difference between the two 
elections. Voters felt much better informed about the General Election. 
 Table 3.2: Did electors feel informed: general election 
 Dumfries and Galloway Fife 
“Not at all well informed”  4.5% 6.2% 
“Not very well informed” 17% 19.8% 
“Well informed” 62.5% 60.3% 
“Very well informed” 16% 13.8% 
 
3.29 While this may not be surprising given that the General Election was a very 
high-profile contest, survey responses and interviews with a selection of 
respondents suggested that the level of public awareness was also much 
lower than local elections. Electors’ feelings of being under-informed about 
the choice facing them clearly played a part in reducing the level of turnout, 
and it seems plausible that the General Election distracted attention from the 
Health Board. 
16 and 17 year old voters 
3.30 The inclusion of 16 and 17 year olds as potential candidates and voters was 
an innovative element of the pilots. 
3.31 Residents who were under 18 on election day but whose 16th birthday *fell on 
or before the 30th of November 2009* were eligible to vote in the election, 
which closed on June 10th, provided that their names appeared on the 
electoral roll. This was the first opportunity for people in this age group to vote 
in Dumfries and Galloway and Fife. Under normal circumstances 16-17-year-
olds can be added to the electoral roll in advance of their 18th birthday, but in 
practice many 16- and 17-year-olds do not have their names added well in 
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advance of their 18th birthday. Despite the efforts made by the Returning 
Officers and their staff to encourage 16-17-year-olds to register before the 
Health Board election, it is possible that 16-17-year-olds were less likely to 
appear on the electoral roll than older residents. In Fife 4,484 16-17 year olds 
were registered while 2,421 were registered in Dumfries & Galloway.  
3.32 Returning Officers’ records showed that 12.9% of the 16-17-year-olds who 
were on the register in Dumfries and Galloway voted, with 312 ballots 
returned. Turnout among registered 16-17-year-olds in Fife was 7%, or 311 
ballots. This means that those 16-17 year olds who were registered to vote 
were significantly less likely to vote than registered electors aged over 18.  
3.33 In Dumfries & Galloway, the local authority’s Youth Strategy Group had 
advised on communications efforts, with advertising concentrating on buses 
and local radio, and information sent to schools for their pupil intranet. In Fife, 
work with local youth groups (including the Big Shout and Members of the 
Scottish Youth Parliament) produced a DVD encouraging young electors to 
vote in the elections12
3.34 Across both Board areas, young people in the focus groups had very little 
awareness or understanding of the elections having taken place. No one in 
any of the groups said they had voted, and most had no recollection of 
hearing about the election. The only exceptions to this were some young 
people who were members of political parties, or whose parents worked in the 
NHS. Notably, this lack of awareness also extended to the existence and 
purpose of board of directors of the Health Board. Several young people 
stated that they assumed the Board was for doctors and nurses. Most young 
people expressed much more enthusiasm for voting in the General Election, 
and attributed this to knowing the purpose of the election, and the perceived 
greater importance of the issues at stake.  
. Copies of the DVD were distributed to schools around 
Fife and played in cafeterias. 
3.35 Young people found the booklet of candidate statements over-long and 
unappealing; several suggested that a photo of the candidate would be more 
engaging. When the discussion moved to better ways of getting information to 
young people, a strong preference was expressed for a face-to-face 
presentation in school. Focus group participants were enthusiastic users of 
the internet and social media but pointed out that they would need prior 
understanding of the election; some felt that information on an election would 
not appeal when using social media: “that’s not what you go on Facebook for, 
is it?” (M, Fife).  
3.36 The potential for 16 & 17 year olds to stand as candidates was surprising to 
focus group participants. Views were divided, with some young people feeling 
that their peers would lack the necessary life experience for the role, and 
other arguing that they would be able to represent young people’s different 
priorities and perspectives. Most said they would not seriously consider 
                                            
12 The content is available at 
http://www.nhsfife.org/nhs/index.cfm?fuseaction=nhs.pagedisplay&p2sid=6F221627-00B4-0FBC-
D6E7FE1717963D1D&themeid=E44C37C3-5056-8C6F-C003CD63C15D8FF0  
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standing, citing a lack of confidence, or worrying that they would lack 
necessary medical knowledge. 
Elected member characteristics 
3.37 We interviewed all of the elected members at least once, and asked them to 
complete a survey so we could gain background information on them. With a 
few exceptions, we were able to gather demographic information from all of 
the members who were initially elected13
3.38 The newly elected members who responded to our survey included several 
holders of advanced qualifications, as summarized in Table 3.3. The elected 
members tended to hold more advanced qualifications than the average for 
their local populations. 
. The new members who responded 
were all over 40, and 60% were over 60. However, none were over 80.  All the 
new members who responded spoke Scots or English as their first language, 
all were White, and all had lived in the Board area for at least five years. Six 
men and four women were elected in Dumfries and Galloway, while six 
women and six men were elected in Fife. Of those who responded to our 
survey, in Dumfries and Galloway two elected members were carers and two 
were parents or guardians of dependent children. No members of NHS Fife 
fell into these categories. 
 Table 3.3: Highest educational qualifications of candidates 
 Fife Dumfries & 
Galloway 
Total 
No formal 
qualifications 
1 0 1 
Standard 
Grades/O- 
levels/School 
leaving certificate 
0 1 1 
Highers/A-levels 1 0 1 
College 
qualifications 
1 4 5 
Degree 2 0 2 
Postgraduate 1 3 4 
 
3.39 By way of comparison, the Office of the Commissioner for Public 
Appointments in Scotland (OCPAS) publishes a breakdown of the 
characteristics of people appointed to public bodies. OCPAS uses slightly 
different age categories than our survey, but by comparison their figures for 
2010/11 show 57.8% of appointees were male, 96.6% were white, and 51% 
declared they were over 55 (with a further 25% aged between 46 and 55, 9% 
                                            
13 For this section we have not included initially-unsuccessful candidates who were subsequently 
offered a seat on the Board after a resignation 
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between 36 and 45 with only 3% under 35)14
3.40 One distinctive feature in NHS Fife was the election of members who had 
previously been appointed to sit on the Board as non-executives, and who 
were compelled to resign when the elections were announced. In order to 
meet the statutory objective of having a majority of the Boards elected, the 
Scottish Government ended some of the existing Non-Executive Directors’ 
terms of office before their original termination dates. In Fife, three of those 
members contested the election and all were elected, while one member 
chose not to seek election. None of the non-executives in Dumfries and 
Galloway who were removed from the Board in this way chose to contest the 
election.  
.  The candidate pool was 
therefore more diverse than the OCPAS appointments.  
3.41 The elected candidates’ statements often referred to professional background, 
in many cases including previous experience in some part of the NHS or in 
the English NHS, which was confirmed in interviews.   
Induction of elected members 
3.42 Elected members received two days of joint induction training at the 
Beardmore NHS Conference Centre in Clydebank, and the two Boards that 
received elected members each organised two days of local induction at their 
own sites. This induction differed from the normal induction process for new 
Board members insofar as new members typically arrive as individuals or as 
very small groups. Introducing new non-executives as large groups made 
these dedicated induction sessions feasible. A number of new members 
stated that they found these sessions helpful; some commented that it was 
valuable to meet other elected board members and some others noted that 
the volume of information could be overwhelming. 
Succession 
3.43 The introduction of elections not only changed the initial selection process, but 
also introduced a new mechanism for replacing elected non-executives who 
left the Board before their term of office expired. As all candidates in the 
election were rank-ordered according to the number of votes they received, 
when members who were initially elected needed to stand down it was 
possible to substitute candidates who had initially been unsuccessful. As 
vacancies arose, vacated seats were offered to the initially unsuccessful 
candidates who had received the largest numbers of votes in the elections. 
3.44 Two elected members of NHS Fife and one elected member of NHS Dumfries 
and Galloway were obliged to resign from the Board by the end of 2011. 
Norma Wilson applied for, and was appointed to, a senior management post 
within NHS Fife that appeared on the list of excluded positions in the Health 
Board (Elections) Bill. Jayne Baxter and Alis Ballance were obliged to resign 
because they were nominated as candidates for the Scottish Parliament. 
                                            
14 http://www.publicappointments.org/publications/publication/115/ocpas-annual-report-201011 page 27 
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3.45 The succession procedure appears to have worked as planned. When the first 
member of NHS Fife resigned, the candidate who was ranked 13th in the 
election was able to take up the vacant position. With the next resignation, the 
candidate who had ranked 14th was able to take up the vacant seat. Similarly, 
the only resignation from NHS Dumfries and Galloway led to the candidate 
who had ranked 11th in the election results taking up the vacated seat.   
3.46 The pilots did not encounter a scenario in which the candidate who was next 
in line was unable or unwilling to take up the post, or in which more than two 
elected members resigned. Such a scenario could potentially occur in future 
elections if a rollout order is made. The pilot gave us no information on how 
such a scenario would play out. 
Exclusions  
3.47 Two of these resignations from the Board were due to candidates for election 
to the Scottish Parliament being compelled to resign from the Health Board on 
submitting their candidacy. The prohibition on candidates for election serving 
on Health Boards did provoke some comments in a range of interviews.  
3.48 Candidates for Parliamentary elections are required to sign a declaration at 
the time of lodging nomination papers stating that they are not disqualified 
from being a member of the Scottish Parliament.  The Scottish Parliament 
(Disqualification) Order 2010 (S.I. 2010/2476) sets out many of the office 
holders who are disqualified, including “Chairman or any member, not being 
also an employee…of a Health Board…”.  Our understanding is that it has 
always been Scottish Government policy that Members of Parliament cannot 
sit on Health Boards, and that this extends to candidates for election to the 
Scottish Parliament. Any member nominated for election would need to resign 
from the Board before nominations were filed. This would apply to appointed 
and elected non-executives, and also to councillors nominated to the Boards. 
However, the policy had not been stringently enforced, leading some 
members to believe that they could stand for election to the Scottish 
Parliament and return to the Board if unsuccessful.  
3.49 The Scottish Government’s decision to tighten enforcement of this policy 
alongside the introduction of elections to Health Boards did put elected 
members who had committed to stand for election as representatives of 
political parties in a position that they found difficult. In effect, these members 
had to give up seats to which they had been elected. While this may have 
appeared in codes of governance, we found not all elected members were 
aware of the implications. We would recommend that implications of the policy 
be given a higher profile in the documentation issued to potential candidates. 
Alternative Pilots 
3.50 In addition to the two electoral pilots two boards were invited to try recruiting 
and selecting non-executive members in a somewhat different way. These 
two initiatives became known as the alternative pilots. The two boards 
involved were Grampian and Lothian. As in the elected pilots, the number of 
Executive Directors was formally reduced to five. However, these pilots added 
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only two additional Non-Executive Directors. Numerically, these pilots led to 
much less dramatic changes in the composition of the Boards, which would 
complicate any comparisons between the elected and alternative pilots. 
3.51 In Grampian, the process for recruiting the two new members differed in that 
the vacancies were advertised more widely than in previous rounds, including 
a two-week advertising campaign on local radio, newspapers and distribution 
of flyers. The Health Board also took advantage of existing networks (such as 
voluntary sector bodies) to identify likely applicants, encouraged potential 
applicants who called the Communications office to apply if this seemed 
appropriate, and invited them to meet existing Board members to discuss the 
role.  
3.52 In Lothian, the two members were recruited by very different methods. One of 
the new members was recruited by a mechanism similar to the Grampian pilot 
– a traditional competitive application open to all members of the public, but 
with a broader advertising strategy than in previous rounds and with possible 
candidates identified through voluntary sector networks. The other member 
was recruited from the office-bearers of Public Partnership Forums (PPFs). All 
office-bearers in the Lothian PPFs were invited to express interest in serving 
on the Board, and the selection panel chose from among those office-bearers 
who declared an interest using a conventional interview process. 
Applicants 
3.53 The Grampian pilot attracted 90 applicants for the two posts, a much higher 
number than such vacancies usually attract (the previous appointment round 
had attracted seven applicants). Not all of these applicants chose to give 
demographic information with their application, but of those who did 51 self-
identified as White and four were from Mixed, Black or Asian backgrounds. 
There were 34 men and 24 women. The age profile of the applicants who 
gave this information is summarized in Table 3.4. 
 Table 3.4: Ages of Grampian applicants 
Age Band 16-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71+ 
Number of 
applicants 
1 6 4 8 18 10 7 
 
3.54 For the open competition, NHS Lothian attracted 30 applicants. Again, not all 
applicants chose to provide demographic information. Of those who did, all 
were White, and there were 12 men and seven women. The age profile of the 
applicants who gave this information is summarized in Table 3.5. 
 Table 3.5: Ages of Lothian applicants 
Age Band 16-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71+ 
Number of 
applicants 
0 1 3 5 8 1 
 
3.55 Eighteen office-bearers in Lothian PPFs expressed an interest in joining the 
Board; no demographic data was available from this selection. 
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3.56 We also conducted our own survey of applicants to Grampian and of 
members of the public who applied to Lothian’s second (open) position. This 
survey received 26 responses from Grampian and 18 from Lothian, a rate that 
may have been reduced by the considerable time that elapsed between this 
survey and the deadline for applications. Our survey asked for information 
that is not gathered during the normal demographic monitoring of applicants. 
This asked about applicants’ level of education, whether they considered 
themselves to be disabled, whether they were carers of adults or children, and 
whether English (or Scots) was their first language. We also asked if they had 
applied to join a Board of governance before. 
3.57 This survey revealed further diversity among the applicants. Three applicants 
to NHS Grampian and two applicants to NHS Lothian self-identified as 
disabled, while five applicants to Grampian and two to Lothian were carers. 
One applicant for each Board reported that English (or Scots) was not their 
first language, while four applicants to each had dependent children. 
3.58 With two exceptions in Grampian, all respondents had lived in the Board area 
for at least 5 years. Similarly, with a few exceptions respondents tended to 
rate their health as good (Table 3.6) 
 Table 3.6: Self-reported state of health, Grampian and Lothian applicants 
Health Grampian Lothian 
Very Good 10 (38.5%) 9 (50%) 
Good 12 (46.2%) 7 (38.9%) 
Fair 2 (7.7%) 1 (5.6%) 
Bad 2 (7.7%) 0 
Very bad 0 1 (5.6%) 
 
3.59 In both cases, most applicants held degrees. The educational qualifications of 
the respondents are summarized in Table 3.7. 
Table 3.7: Self-reported educational qualifications, Grampian and 
Lothian applicants 
Qualifications Grampian  Lothian 
No formal 1 (3.8%) 0 
Standard Grades or 
similar 
1 (3.8%) 1 (5.6%) 
Highers or similar 3 (11.5%) 0 
College qualifications 1 (3.8%) 1 (5.6%) 
University degree 11 (42.3%) 7 (38.9%) 
Postgraduate 8 (30.8%) 9 (50%) 
(no response) 1 (3.8%)  
 
3.60 Responses to our survey suggested one notable difference between the 
Boards: respondents who applied to NHS Lothian were significantly more 
likely to have applied (or been invited) to join Boards of governance15
                                            
15 Not only NHS Boards, but also boards of companies and charities. 
 before 
than were applicants to NHS Grampian. Fourteen of the 18 respondents from 
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Lothian (78%) had applied to Boards of other organisations before this 
application, as opposed to only 10 of 26 respondents from Grampian.  
3.61 It is worth remembering that neither the demographic monitoring as part of the 
application process nor our survey had a 100% response rate. 
3.62 Thus, the alternative pilots do appear to have contributed to some increased 
diversity at the application stage. However, it is important to remember that 
selection from among these applicants continued to be made using a 
conventional OCPAS-approved method, based on a long application form and 
a competency-based interview. The alternative pilots formally changed only 
the process by which applicants were encouraged to submit forms to the 
Scottish Government and OCPAS for scrutiny. After that point selection 
progressed as normal, although the selection criteria for these appointments 
were weighted towards ability to provide a generalist perspective on the 
Boards’ activities rather than possession of any specific technical knowledge 
(e.g. of finance or human resource management). In this respect the 
alternative pilots were very different from the elections. Elections recruited far 
greater numbers of potential non-executives and effectively bypassed the 
selection process normally put in place by the Scottish Government and 
OCPAS. If these methods were to be rolled out across Scotland, the 
conventional selection process would still shape the composition of new non-
executive cohorts even if the size and diversity of the applicant pool were 
increased. The question of whether it would be possible or desirable to alter 
the Scottish Government and OCPAS selection process for non-executives 
technically falls outside the remit of this report. However there is clearly scope 
to do this should Ministers and Parliament decide that that would improve the 
appointment process.   
Induction of alternative pilot appointees 
3.63 The pilot appointees in both Grampian and Lothian received tailored induction 
and training similar to any standard appointed non-executive, delivered by the 
relevant Board. Due to the different timescales of these pilots, they were not 
present at the Beardmore induction sessions for elected members. 
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4 COSTINGS 
 
Elections  
4.1 The Health Boards and Local Authorities reported that the pilot elections and 
associated publicity cost £473,850 in Fife and £299,406 in Dumfries and 
Galloway.  
4.2 The main costs of an all-postal election come from printing and posting ballot 
papers and counting the returns. The cost of running a direct election is 
therefore proportional to the number of people eligible to vote and the turnout. 
In principle, we can therefore estimate the cost of running similar elections 
across Scotland by multiplying the average costs of the elections in the two 
pilot areas to correspond to the population of Scotland. The two pilot areas 
had 403,139 registered electors, 10.36% of the electors in Scotland. Simply 
multiplying the costs of the pilot elections (£773,256) to correspond with the 
number of electors in Scotland suggests a total cost of £7.46m per election. 
4.3 However, this assumes that turnout in a Scotland-wide poll would be the 
same as turnout in the pilot elections. Returning Officers were instructed to 
prepare for the election on the perhaps optimistic assumption of 60% turnout, 
so as to reduce the chance of the count being delayed by unexpectedly large 
numbers of votes. This would presumably be repeated in any future elections. 
However, the postal cost would vary depending on the actual level of voter 
turnout. This should be factored into our estimate. Given the large differences 
in turnout between Dumfries and Galloway and Fife, it is difficult to predict the 
turnout rate across Scotland. However if one assumes equal turnout across 
all board areas then we estimate the most basic cost of running the elections 
at different levels of turnout would range from £7.44M at 15%, through 
£7.73M at 30% and up to £8.13M at 50%. However, such estimates of cost do 
not allow for important issues of accessibility and security which we believe 
would be considered desirable in future elections. We deal with these issues 
in sections 4.8 to 4.9. Other additional cost factors are discussed in sections 
4.9 to 4.15  
4.4 Estimates assume that elections in all Health Board areas would be 
contested. The pilots attracted many candidates and it seems reasonable to 
assume that at least the first elections would generate enough interest to 
require a vote.  
4.5 These figures reflect the cost of the election process. We have not included 
the additional costs of paying and training larger cohorts of non-executive 
members if their numbers were increased as a result of the elections. 
4.6 There are several important caveats to these figures, which suggest that the 
figures would be a low estimate of the cost of direct elections. 
4.7 Firstly, the pilot elections did not have the security features normally required 
for postal voting. In a conventional election, only electors who have registered 
for a postal ballot receive one. When requesting a postal ballot those electors 
give their date of birth and a sample signature. When they return a completed 
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ballot paper, they give another signature that is checked against the specimen 
to verify their identity. In the pilot elections, no signatures were required. As 
there is no national database of electors’ signatures, in order to obtain a 
similar level of security Returning Officers would need to either create such a 
database or devise an alternative security check. While we saw no evidence 
of fraudulent voting in the pilot elections, if Parliament were to mandate a 
national rollout without security measures there would be an increased risk of 
fraudulent voting. We understand that when the Bill which led to these pilots 
was going through Parliament a representative of the Scottish Assessors 
estimated the cost of such measures at £1 per elector, which would imply an 
added cost of a little under £4m per election cycle. Thus this factor alone 
could increase the cost of an election to a total of somewhere around £11 to 
£12 Million. This and further factors articulated below make it likely that the 
cost of running these elections under normal conditions would significantly 
exceed the figures reached by a simple extrapolation from the pilot elections.  
4.8 The second of these factors is translation. The ballot papers and candidate 
statements were delivered only in conventional print and in English. If 
elections were rolled out across Scotland there would need to be some 
mechanism for translation. There is no national database showing which 
electors do not understand English or have sight problems. Some mechanism 
would need to be put in place to ensure electors who needed translations or 
large print/tactile ballots and candidate statements would have access to 
them. This would inevitably add additional cost. 
4.9 Thirdly, the cost for electronic counting is extrapolated from the outcome of 
negotiations between the Returning Officers and Opt2vote on this occasion. 
New payment structures would have to be negotiated were the elections to be 
rolled out nationally. There are only a few private companies specialising in 
the electronic counting of ballot papers that could fill this role in Scotland. The 
nature of their business involves bursts of high demand for personnel and 
equipment on election days. If elections occurred at points of high demand, 
Returning Officers might find it more difficult to obtain such competitive terms 
as they did for the pilots.  
4.10 Fourth, in the pilots no attempt was made to create a register of 15-year-old 
attainers. This led to a large number of 16-year-olds whose birthdays fell on 
the wrong side of the 29th of November being ineligible to vote in the pilot 
elections on the 10th of June. If all 16-year-olds were to be eligible to vote in 
any future Health Board elections, then a register of 15-year-olds who would 
become 16 in the next year would need to be added to the annual canvass. 
Stringent privacy laws for under-16s may well imply a need to keep a 
separate register for those attainers, and there might be costs associated with 
this.  
4.11 Fifth, ballots were printed in alphabetical order. There has been some 
speculation that this advantaged certain candidates over others because of 
the very large numbers of candidates who stood in the two pilot elections. We 
have no evidence to support this, but would advise that Parliament consider 
making some provision for the order of candidate names on ballot papers to 
be randomised if elections are rolled out. This would probably increase the 
  31 
cost or complexity of printing ballot papers, as more print runs would be 
required (see 6.6 for more on this point). 
4.12 Sixth, the low levels of voter awareness suggest that extra spending on 
publicity might be beneficial. 
4.13 There would also be some unquantifiable costs in staff time to both the 
Returning Officers and the Health Boards. By their nature the elections 
introduced a large number of relatively inexperienced non-executives at one 
time, which created pressure on pilot Board officials to provide extra support. 
4.14 The pilot elections increased the number of non-executive members on the 
Health Boards, leading to an added pay cost (and an unpredictable figure for 
extra expenses). The number of non-executives allocated to each Board is a 
matter for Parliament and the Scottish Government, but each additional non-
executive would cost £8000 per year plus expenses, assuming that no pay 
was reclaimed from executives losing their Board status. If territorial Boards 
gained six non-executives on average (as in Dumfries and Galloway) the 
payroll cost would be £672,000 per year16
4.15 Note that we have not considered the possibility of paying members of Health 
Board Committees, a possibility raised by the Health Boards (Membership 
and Elections) (Scotland) Bill. We have not considered the possibility of extra 
legal costs were the result of a Health Board election ever to be challenged. 
. 
Alternative Pilots 
4.16 The alternative pilots added only two new members to each Health Board. 
However, even taking into account the fact that the elections produced more 
new members the alternative pilots still had much lower costs.   
Grampian 
4.17 The major cost difference between the Grampian pilot and a conventional 
public appointment was an increase in advertising cost of £8022 for the 
Health Board area. The pilot also added two extra non-executives who are 
paid £8000 per year and can claim expenses; because of the NHS pay 
protection policy, the salaries of two executives who could otherwise have had 
Board status were not reduced. 
4.18 The cost of the extra non-executives rolling out a similar advertising 
programme across Scotland would vary depending on the advertising 
techniques used and negotiations with individual media outlets. The cost of 
advertising will of course vary depending on the characteristics of the Board 
area: a square inch in a small local newspaper costs less than a square inch 
of a newspaper with a much larger circulation. On the other hand, newspaper 
and radio coverage does not necessarily map well onto the boundaries of 
territorial Health Boards, and media based in the major population centres 
within which advertising is expensive dominates many rural or suburban 
                                            
16 Scotland has 14 territorial Boards, so if Boards gained an average of six non-executives the figure 
would be 14 x 6 x £8000 = £672,000 plus expenses. 
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areas. It is therefore difficult to predict the relative costs of comparable 
advertising campaigns in different areas precisely.  
4.19 Given these variables, a reasonable estimate for the extra cost is simply to 
multiply the additional costs for the pilot by the number of territorial Health 
Boards in Scotland, giving a figure of £224,000 per year, and £112,308 per 
appointment round, at 2010 prices. 
4.20 There would also be significant but unquantifiable opportunity costs in staff 
time to the Health Boards. For example, staff would need to spend time 
providing advice and encouragement to potential applicants when they could 
potentially have been working on other tasks. 
Lothian 
4.21 The costs of the open recruitment round in Lothian were similar. Recruiting a 
member from among the existing PPF office-bearers actually saved money, 
as there was no need to publicly advertise the vacancy; the Board simply 
wrote to them. Otherwise, the costs of selection in OCPAS assessors’ time 
etc. would have been comparable with a conventional public appointment. 
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5 IMPACT 
 
5.1 This section examines the impact of the pilots on how the Health Boards 
operate, with a focus on public engagement and accountability. 
5.2 The pilots altered the mechanism by which non-executives were appointed to 
the Boards, and removed some senior executives’ membership. It is important 
to be aware that these pilots were not the only changes taking place in the 
NHS over the two initial years of the pilots. Territorial Health Boards, including 
non-pilot Boards, continued to innovate. We had opportunities to discuss 
innovations that were unrelated to the pilots with staff of the pilot Boards and 
NHS Tayside. Clearly, there are many other factors that affect how Boards 
operate besides the institutional means of selecting non-executives. As the 
Higgs Report emphasises, “Effective boards depend as much on behaviours 
and relationships as on procedures and structures”17
5.3 Changes must also be seen in light of traditional norms of Health Board 
behaviour, some of which came under pressure during the pilots. Throughout 
the pilots, but with particular effects in the early stages, some uncertainty was 
evident regarding the appropriate role that elected non-executives should 
play, and the extent to which this should vary from a standard appointed non-
executive.  
. Changes resulting from 
the pilots need to be seen in this broader context.  
5.4 Chris Skelcher describes the three roles of Board members as:  
• contributing an independent view and expertise;  
• an ‘internal role’ focused on corporate strategy and performance monitoring; 
• and an ‘external role’ dealing with stakeholders and the public18
 
. 
In Scottish Health Boards, interviews suggest that the ‘internal role’ has been 
the focus of the non-executive workload. Broadly, the expectations of the 
Health Boards was that their boards of directors are corporate bodies with 
corporate responsibility (meaning that it is inappropriate to disown or speak 
out against collective decision) and do not engage in operational matters, 
which are the province of the executives. Board non-executive members, are 
seen to be responsible for governance, meaning monitoring performance (e.g. 
inspection of annual accounts) and deciding high-level strategy (e.g. approval 
of the budget and identification of the Board’s overarching priorities). In this 
understanding, widely shared among our interviewees, it is not appropriate for 
non-executive directors to engage in operational issues, impugn collective 
decisions once they have been taken, or play a particularly visible public role. 
Additionally there is minimal opportunity for members to initiate or pro-actively 
raise issues for discussion, as their role is primarily one of scrutiny and 
holding to account. The Board as a whole is then accountable to the Scottish 
Parliament via the Scottish Government, a point made clear at the central 
induction for elected members.  
                                            
17 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file23012.pdf page 17 
18 Skelcher, C. (1998) The Appointed State. p104 
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5.5 However several newly elected members stated that they felt an additional, or 
in a few cases primary, accountability to the public of their Board area. They 
felt this required greater activity within the external (public-facing) role, and 
accordingly greater emphasis on pro-actively contributing to Board decision-
making. Where particular issues relating to this difference of perspective 
arose, with a key example being whether elected non-executives should hold 
‘surgeries’ or public meetings, difficulties could arise. In Dumfries & Galloway, 
guidance was sought from the Scottish Government on whether this was an 
appropriate activity for elected non-executive members. The Government’s 
position was that Boards themselves should decide. This context of 
uncertainty frames most of the following findings.  
The Impact of new non-executive directors 
5.6 This section summarises the impact of adding new non-executives by election 
or amended appointment processes. 
Skills, experience and learning 
5.7 Several of the elected members had served on boards of one kind or another, 
and some had experience within the NHS as clinicians. A small number had 
previously served on Health Boards, including three appointed members who 
had been removed from NHS Fife only a few weeks earlier to make way for 
newly elected members. However, interviews with existing personnel 
suggested that they saw many of the new members as having less 
experience in corporate governance than would be the norm for appointees 
who had come through a conventional selection procedure. 
5.8 There was a general feeling that many new members’ behaviour differed from 
established members’ due to their relative inexperience. This was partly a 
normal part of adding new non-executives to a Health Board. Interviewees in 
Fife in particular had more difficulty in distinguishing the new members’ 
behaviour from that of newly appointed non-executives they had encountered 
in previous years. Interviews with existing non-executives and members of all-
appointed Boards further emphasised that new non-executives typically take 
several months, sometimes over a year, to develop in the role. What made 
the impact of these new members different was at least partly that ten and 
twelve of them arrived simultaneously. In our interviewees’ past experience 
non-executives had arrived as individuals or in pairs and would take some 
time to become active members, during which time they would develop a 
sense of how the Board operated. With many new members being added at 
once this slow socialisation process was interrupted.  
5.9 One dimension in which this relative lack of experience manifested itself was 
in the focus of new members’ questions around the Board table. Several 
continuing members in Dumfries & Galloway expressed concern that elected 
members became too involved in operational matters (for example, engaging 
in long discussions about the technical specifications of new equipment to be 
purchased) at the expense of the strategic discussion that they expected to 
dominate Board meetings. Several of the elected members had backgrounds 
in medical practice, which gave them particular interests in areas which 
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established members considered to be more the ‘operational’ domain of 
professional managers than the kinds of higher-level aspects of Board 
business with which they would expect non-executives to concern 
themselves.  
5.10 Similarly, the largely reactive role of scrutiny is conventionally fulfilled through 
careful reading of Board papers and questioning of Executive members. In 
both Fife and Dumfries and Galloway, some elected members expressed 
frustration about the lack of opportunity to make a pro-active contribution in 
the manner they had anticipated, finding Board meetings more focused on 
scrutiny and accordingly offering less opportunity for debate than expected. 
Closely related to this, a number of elected members expressed surprise or 
frustration at the extent to which Board activity and decision-making is 
circumscribed by central Government policy. Having been elected, they had 
expected Boards to have greater autonomy and thus more scope for decision-
making. 
5.11 The new members’ questioning also tended to include more general queries 
(what several members referred to as “daft laddie” or “daft lassie” questions) 
than had been the case before the pilots began. Despite the informal moniker, 
“daft laddie” or “daft lassie" questions are often seen as helpful in a non-
executive’s role. Non-executive lay members are after all brought onto Boards 
precisely to question conventional wisdom within the organisation, and this 
seems to be an important part of the rationale for limiting their terms of 
appointment. Being willing to ask questions to which the answers seem 
obvious to longstanding NHS ‘insiders’ can be an important and constructive 
part of the role. On the other hand, too many might detract from strategic 
discussion and monitoring within a finite amount of time. The kinds of 
questions asked were different after the elections, but there was not a clear 
consensus among interviewees on whether this represented more rigorous 
and creative scrutiny or a diversion from important questions.  
5.12 There was a general consensus that adding large numbers of new non-
executives simultaneously put greater pressure on staff to provide appropriate 
support and training. This clearly had a significant opportunity cost for the 
Boards in that staff time spent on supporting new members could potentially 
have been used for other activities. On the other hand, adding the elected 
members as a large group did allow for some specialised, dedicated induction 
training when they arrived.   
5.13 The variability of elected members’ backgrounds and skills appears to be an 
inherent consequence of electing, rather than interviewing and selecting, non-
executives. As such, it is impossible to guarantee that new members will 
arrive with all the skills needed to perform a corporate governance function. 
Elections prioritise other characteristics - electoral appeal - over the skills 
matrix previously used to identify the desirable characteristics of new non-
executive directors. To some extent the alternative pilot model, which selected 
a new member from a Public Partnership Forum, also prioritises a non-skill-
related characteristic – being a PPF office-bearer – over possession of 
particular skills. While the electorate may choose candidates with skills that 
are perceived to be required for Board roles, there is no guarantee that the 
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factors that make someone appealing to voters will always be matched with 
such skills. To some extent similar considerations apply to the alternative 
model, which selected a member of a PPF, where the pool of applicants was 
restricted to PPF office-bearers and skills were only one criterion for selection 
within that pool. On the other hand, an interview process can prioritise skills of 
corporate governance over other qualities. Thus, support and training beyond 
that normally required by new non-executives may well be needed for 
members who join Health Boards by these routes.  
Board dynamics 
5.14 Different elected members varied in their initial attitude to the existing Board. 
While there had been controversies surrounding the centralisation of services 
within Fife in previous years, the Board’s general strategy was well-
established by 2010. In Dumfries and Galloway, the election took place 
against a backdrop of campaigns against service reorganisation. In general, 
our interviews with elected members before they were elected suggested that 
they were open to being persuaded to other points of view and compromising 
with other Board members. However, some elected non-executives were felt 
to have arrived with a more confrontational attitude to existing members than 
others. Voters in several rural areas had concerns about small local hospitals 
being closed. Proposals to replace these ‘cottage’ hospitals, which were 
circulated before the beginning of the pilots, led some residents to believe a 
decision had already been made to centralise health services in the region. 
Candidates picked up on this. Where candidates who were elected saw their 
role on the Board as being primarily to represent electors who wanted to 
protect small local hospitals from the threat of closure, this could lead to 
confrontation.  
5.15 In addition, the removal of several experienced non-executives combined with 
the addition of a large number of new non-executives was an unprecedented 
change in Board membership in Dumfries and Galloway. Trusting working 
relationships, which had built up over years, were broken up within a short 
time and understandably members took some time to build up similar working 
relationships with their new colleagues. In Fife, while the change was also 
unusually dramatic, there was a relatively greater degree of continuity in 
personnel due to formerly appointed non-executives winning election. Chairs 
of Board committees were initially allocated to experienced non-executives 
who had previously served on NHS Boards either in Fife or elsewhere. 
Important decisions on hospital provision had already been made, and 
contracts signed, before the pilot began.  
5.16 Board agendas are circumscribed by legislation, and non-executives’ 
opportunities to add specific points to the agenda are limited by the need to 
cover a fixed agenda within a limited time. Typically, within formal Board 
meetings non-executives react to reports from committees and officers rather 
than raising matters. There were notable deviations from this pattern in 
Dumfries and Galloway as several elected members wishing to raise issues of 
concern used the ‘Matters Arising’  or ‘Any Other Business’ sections of the 
agenda. These interventions became quite extensive. However over time, and 
  37 
in particular with the departure of a particular elected member, this became 
less frequent.  
5.17 One behaviour we observed in both of these Boards (which seemed to mark a 
distinction between elected and appointed members) was discussion about 
the minuting of individual contributions. Neither Board had traditionally 
produced verbatim minutes of Board or committee meetings; instead, minutes 
summarised the key points of discussion. In both Fife and Dumfries and 
Galloway some elected members were keen to have their personal 
contributions to discussions noted. This reflected some elected members 
being keen that they be judged based on their own personal performance, as 
well as the outcome for the Board collectively. Again, it is difficult to be certain 
of whether this reflected their having been elected – and therefore feeling that 
members of the public can hold them to account as individuals rather than 
parts of a collective – or whether new appointed members tend to share this 
feeling and lose it over time. In Fife the concern over minuting related 
specifically to a particular issue of governance (a question of whether one of 
the Board’s committees was exceeding its mandate) whereas in Dumfries and 
Galloway similar concerns were expressed repeatedly in different contexts. 
5.18 Not all changes in the dynamics of Board meetings were necessarily caused 
by the fact that new members were elected, as these pilots also led to other 
changes in the Boards’ make-up. The elections also made both Boards 
significantly larger. In Fife especially, where the Board increased to 23 
members plus several attendees, increased size was associated with much 
longer meetings. This resulted partly from elected members asking more 
questions and pursuing them for longer, but also from the simple increase in 
the number of people around the table. While the rationale for increasing the 
number of Board members is clear from the legislation, it is worth being aware 
that there is a cost to increasing numbers in that large Boards can become 
ponderous (as noted, for example, by the Higgs Report on corporate 
governance19
5.19 While elected members were seen as behaving differently from appointed 
members, interviewees were sometimes unclear on why this was. Differences 
could be attributed to their being elected, to their arriving in a large group 
(such that 10 or 12 members who were appointed to the Board 
simultaneously might have behaved in the same way), or to personal 
idiosyncrasies that might also have occurred in new appointees. There was a 
strong sense that the new members who were elected to the Board quickly 
developed a commitment to keep the Board operating effectively, even if they 
had not necessarily approved of all the Board’s decisions in the past. Existing 
members had some concerns before the election that elected members might 
behave in ways that impeded the functions of the Board. After the elections, 
however, these continuing members perceived the new cohort as developing 
what one Executive Director referred to as a “social norm of non-
executiveness” – a set of informal expectations about how it was acceptable 
). There are inherent costs to increasing the number of 
members, which need to be balanced against the benefits of introducing a 
larger number of different perspectives. 
                                            
19http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file23012.pdf  
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(and unacceptable) for themselves and other non-executives to behave. New 
members continued to ask critical questions, and press for improvement on 
specific points, but this was done in a constructive manner comparable to the 
behaviours that we and our interviewees had observed in other (all-appointed) 
Boards.  
5.20 Hence, while there were instances in which the new non-executives in Fife did 
behave differently from their predecessors, these instances need to be seen 
against a broader pattern of the new members being willing to compromise 
with each other and established members. The NHS Fife Board voted only 
once between June 2010 and the beginning of 2012, on a complex issue 
surrounding a General Practitioner in Balmullo’s permission to dispense 
prescriptions (which had aroused strong feeling in the local community). A few 
of the elected members found themselves in the minority, but once the 
decision was reached they did not pursue the opposition further.  By contrast, 
the Board in Dumfries and Galloway began voting regularly and on several 
occasions a dissenting member wrote to local newspapers after votes had 
been taken, arguing that a collective decision of the Board members was 
incorrect. Publicly opposing corporate decisions in this way represented a 
major departure from the norms of non-executive behaviour, although only a 
few of the new members engaged in such activity.  
5.21 Most of our interviewees were unable to identify significant differences of 
approach between the new members in Grampian and Lothian and other non-
executives that could be attributed to the selection process. While there was 
recognition that they brought assets from their own personal backgrounds and 
experience, and they were viewed positively as individuals, it was much more 
difficult to identify instances where their behaviour was very different from 
other non-executives’ at similar stages in their appointments. This is probably 
unsurprising, as the process they passed through was very similar to the 
normal process for appointing non-executives from the application stage 
onwards. Interviewees also stressed that typically non-executives who join the 
Board in small numbers take several months, or even over a year, to develop 
fully into their new role and for their personal characteristics to begin to 
influence the overall dynamic. In later interviews, pilot appointees in Lothian 
emphasised that they had were encouraged and supported to attend 
particularly to a ‘patients’-eye’ perspective in their Board activities.  
Impact on public engagement 
5.22 All NHS Boards in Scotland have strategies for Patient Focus and Public 
Involvement, which are monitored and supported by the Scottish Health 
Council. Their PFPI or Participation practice is self-assessed against the 
Participation Standard, with levels reached and plans for improvement agreed 
by the Scottish Health Council. However, public engagement activities tend to 
be carried out at operational level, and in most cases have not been seen as 
the appropriate role for the Board of Directors. Most (pre-pilot) appointed non-
executive members in the pilot Boards affirmed the importance of public 
engagement activities, but did not understand this as a central part of their 
own functions, which were understood as concerned with a more corporate 
vision of governance. This is not to say that appointed non-executive 
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members were not supportive of these activities, but they were understood as 
operational, not strategic functions. Existing appointed members said they 
occasionally received representations from members of the public, but that 
these would be passed on to the appropriate member of staff. 
5.23 It would not, however, be fair to say that appointed non-executives were 
insulated from the general public. Appointed non-executive members who 
were currently or had previously served as CHP or CHCP Chair had more 
public-facing roles, including regular contact with Public Partnership Forums 
and other stakeholders. Where Boards had recently undertaken broad 
strategic consultations on contentious matters such as potential hospital 
closures, non-executive members had often represented the Board at public 
meetings. Annual Reviews are held in public, are generally somewhat better 
attended than regular Board meetings, and include an opportunity for 
members of the public to ask questions. All pilot Boards have a number of lay 
representatives on their committees of governance. Notably, a number of 
existing appointed non-executive members also saw their particular 
experience or skill-set being about the public (or consumer) perspective, as 
opposed to management or financial expertise. 
5.24 During the pilot period, a number of changes were observed to the Board of 
Directors' roles in public engagement. Few can be directly causally attributed 
to the pilot itself: the pilot is only one part of broader moves for the Board of 
Directors to have a more public-facing role. Some changes were present 
across all pilot Boards. For example, in each Board there was discussion of 
how to increase public engagement with Board meetings, whether by making 
Board papers more accessible or altering meeting arrangements. Each pilot 
Board already had at least one meeting per year in an alternative 
geographical location within the Board area. In NHS Lothian, options 
discussed included webcasting of meetings and holding meetings in evenings. 
However in this matter, as in other discussions, many Board members 
expressed concern that there was a trade-off between measures to increase 
engagement and corporate effectiveness: for example, that non-executive 
members would feel inhibited in debate if the meeting was being broadcast, or 
that accessible papers may lack the degree of detail required to adequately 
hold executive members to account. 
5.25 Other changes can be understood as more directly attributable to the pilot. In 
Dumfries & Galloway, as a result of occasionally heated debates about 
whether elected non-executive members should hold 'surgeries' in the style of 
an MSP or Councillor, a series of Board engagement sessions were planned. 
These were not perceived to have been a success by Board members, and 
were very poorly attended by the public. In Fife, some individual elected 
members who had committed to make themselves available to the public in 
their candidate statements did so by taking part in public events organised by 
the Board. They appeared alongside existing Board members and NHS staff. 
In both cases these meetings differed substantially from the kinds of private 
surgeries held by MSPs and Councillors. Several elected members did not 
wish to hold surgeries and did not see making themselves directly available to 
members of the public as part of their role. Most continued to channel any 
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feedback they received from members of the public to Health Board staff, as 
had been standard practice before the pilot. 
5.26 Both existing appointed and newly elected non-executives were asked about 
whether they understood their role as representing the public. Across both 
appointed and elected members there was some variation in view. Appointed 
members were marginally more likely to say that they did not see themselves 
as representing the public on the Board. Instead, some saw their role as 
ensuring the effective operation of the organisation for the public. Several 
explicitly said that they felt the absence of pressure for re-election helped 
them to make difficult decisions without ‘looking over their shoulder’ at voters. 
However other appointed members were quite clear that they saw themselves 
as public representatives. Elected members told us they understood their role 
as including representing the public, but there was variation in whether this 
was seen as but one component of the non-executive role, or was its central 
purpose. Likewise, some members who felt very strongly rooted in a particular 
community (whether geographical or of interest) emphasised representing a 
sub-set of ‘the public’. These differences in opinion were not merely semantic: 
the extent to which an elected member emphasised their role as a public 
representative made a difference to their preferences for engaging with the 
public (informally, or in arranged meetings) and taking a visible role in the 
media.  
5.27 As with other potential effects, in both Lothian and Grampian the far smaller 
number of new members limited the extent to which the pilot could be 
expected to have an impact on public engagement. In Lothian, the member 
who was recruited through Public Partnership Forums continued to be a 
member of his PPF. This created opportunities for him to act as a direct link 
between the Board and this group of members of the public. However, he 
emphasised that views from the PPF mostly continued to be fed back to 
Board level in the usual way, via the CHP. While we can see a theoretical 
case for this model enhancing public engagement through strengthened and 
more direct ties between the Boards and PPFs, it is difficult to draw firm 
conclusions from a single appointment. 
Media profile 
5.28 One important finding from all our investigations, from the public survey to 
voter interviews to Board observations to interviews with Board members, is 
that Non-Executive Directors of Health Boards typically have a very low public 
profile. Apart from the Chairmen and Councillors nominated as stakeholder 
members, very few of the non-executives on any of the Boards would have 
been regularly mentioned in media coverage before the pilots began, or 
indeed familiar to members of the public through any other route. If changing 
the appointment process for non-executives is seen as a means of increasing 
public engagement with the NHS, then increased publicity surrounding non-
executives’ roles might be symptomatic of changes in the relationship 
between Board members and the public they serve. Accordingly, we 
summarise major changes below.  
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5.29 In Grampian and Lothian the new non-executives, like many existing non-
executives, had virtually no media exposure. 
5.30 The elected members in Dumfries and Galloway and Fife varied in how far 
they sought media attention and how much coverage they actually received. 
Most appeared in media coverage only immediately after the elections (when 
their success was reported) and did not attract significant attention thereafter. 
However, there were several exceptions. 
5.31 In Fife, Arthur Morris’ contributions at Board meetings were occasionally 
picked up, but this seems to be linked to his personal background as a 
surgeon and former BMA official (he was described in the Dunfermline Press 
of 1st September 2011 as “Board member Arthur Morris, a retired surgeon”). 
Dave Stewart was frequently quoted in the local press, usually in his role as 
Operational Division Chair. He had previously held this post as an appointed 
member of the Board and had also appeared in the local press as an 
appointee. Local newspapers did refer to him specifically as an “elected 
member”. One unusually high-profile appearance after the pilot began related 
to some potentially inflammatory comments made in the December Board 
(reported in the Courier of 22nd December 2010) about the Board’s 
relationship with Fife Council. Similarly, new elected member John Winton 
had enjoyed a high profile as a campaigner for services at Queen Margaret 
Hospital before the pilots began and continued to be quoted by journalists 
from time to time after he was elected. Some of this coverage suggested 
disagreements with the Board’s policies, although our interviews suggested 
that the press coverage might have exaggerated disagreements. Neither 
members nor the Board can control the manner in which journalists report 
comments made during public Board meetings. 
5.32 Similarly, in Dumfries and Galloway most elected members received very little 
media coverage besides announcement of their election. Those who did 
typically had some media profile before their election. For example, Alf 
Hannay was quoted in the Annandale Herald a few months after being elected 
(18th December 2011) and his criticism of the recruitment of a Public Health 
Consultant in one of the higher pay bands made the local BBC news on 11th 
May 2011. Mr Hannay was also willing to brief the press directly on the 
constraints imposed on the Health Board by government spending restraint 
(Dumfries and Galloway Standard 6th October 2010). However, it is worth 
bearing in mind that he had a local media profile as a Unison official (and 
indeed as a councillor several years earlier) before being elected (quoted in, 
for example, the Dumfries and Galloway Standard of 2nd June 2010). 
5.33 A relatively high level of media interest in the elected members began with an 
article in the Dumfries and Galloway Standard on the 2nd of July 2010 
reporting that anonymous new members had told journalists that they were 
unclear on their roles. The elected member who attracted most publicity in 
2010 and early 2011 was Alis Ballance, who actively wrote to local 
newspapers disagreeing with collective decisions. Of all the elected members 
she had campaigned most explicitly on a platform of saving the region’s 
community hospitals, and in office she maintained her commitments. Media 
coverage of Ms Ballance’s role on the Health Board began when local press 
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picked up on a disagreement in the Board between elected members who 
wished to hold one-to-one surgeries with members of the public (Ms Ballance 
and Tommy Sloan), in the same way as local councillors do, and other 
members (reported, for example, in the Dumfries and Galloway Standard of 
3rd November 2010). She continued to write to newspapers both in her role 
as Convener of the local Green Party (Dumfries and Galloway Standard 17th 
September 2010) and as an elected member of the Health Board. She called 
for community hospitals to be kept open in a letter to the Dumfries and 
Galloway Standard (15th October 2010) and arranged for a public lecture in 
her local community on how a Health Board decision to close community  
hospitals in Cumbria had been overturned (Dumfries and Galloway Standard 
13th October 2010). Following a collective decision that Board Members 
should not hold one-to-one consultations with members of the public, but 
should instead participate in collective public engagement sessions of which 
she was highly critical, Ms Ballance felt obligated to hold individual surgeries. 
She was criticised for this by the Chief Executive in the press (Dumfries and 
Galloway Standard 11th February 2011).  
5.34 Ms Ballance was obliged to stand down from Dumfries and Galloway Board 
when she decided to contest the 2011 Scottish Parliament election; in her 
resignation letter to local newspapers she cited “conflict” with the other 
members of the Board and accused Dumfries and Galloway of having 
“abused” the pilot elections (Galloway Gazette, 9th March 2011). 
5.35 In both Boards, non-executives who previously had high profiles in the media 
seem to have retained media interest. This created both risks and potential 
opportunities for the Boards’ communication with the media and, indirectly, 
the public. However, it is important not to overstate the increased media 
interest in non-executives. Even in the elected Boards, the members who 
were most commonly quoted in the media continued to be the Chairmen and 
the Executive Directors, along with other senior NHS staff. 
Removal of executives’ board status 
5.36 Board members who remained in place over the course of the pilot typically 
portrayed the removal of two executives from Board-member Director status 
as either causing no appreciable change (as those Directors continued to 
attend meetings as before) or having a mildly negative effect on Board 
efficiency and transparency. There was concern at a lack of advance 
consultation, and the short notice given to the Boards when they were asked 
to reduce the number of Executive Directors also caused some complaint.  
Assessing overall impact on pilot boards; understanding scale and context. 
5.37 Elections to NHS Dumfries and Galloway were held against the background of 
major service redesign. This led to significant changes in the Board dynamic, 
particularly in the first twelve months of the pilot. Some elected members had 
explicitly campaigned on issues that were part of the Clinical Services 
Strategy regarding the future locations of secondary care in the region. In the 
first twelve months decision-making became noticeably less consensual and 
disagreements, which might previously have been discussed privately, were 
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debated in public meetings. In this period the Board was far more likely to 
take a formal vote on decisions than has been the case hitherto: many of 
these votes related to issues of Board procedure rather than substantive 
Board business. After the initial twelve months, and coinciding with the 
departure of Ms Ballance and a period of Board development work with an 
external consultant, Board meetings became less contentious.  
5.38 In Fife, the impact was more subtle. Successful candidates had not stood on 
platforms that were at odds with the Board’s existing strategy. There were 
some changes, including more extended Board meetings with more time 
devoted to discussion. Some new members did clearly develop personal 
interests in particular aspects of the service to which they were particularly 
keen to draw attention. The new members did seem to produce a greater 
diversity of views. There was disagreement among our interviewees as to how 
far this was a consequence of their being elected or whether appointing a 
large number of new non-executives could have changed the Board dynamic 
in similar ways. Decision-making remained more consensual than in Dumfries 
and Galloway. Only one formal vote was tabled in the course of our 
observation, and while several elected members voted against the decision 
that was eventually taken they adhered to the decision thereafter. Very few 
members of the public attempted to influence the Board by contacting elected 
members directly, and most of the non-executives who were approached 
referred members of the public who contacted them to NHS Fife’s 
communications team, as had been standard practice before the elections. 
5.39 The alternative pilots have shown that when Health Boards are given some 
latitude in advertising non-executive vacancies they can attract large and 
diverse bodies of applicants. The individuals selected in this way seem to 
have impressed both the selectors and their new colleagues. However, while 
they did see themselves as having a distinctive relationship to public opinion, 
there was only a subtle difference between their perception of their role and 
that of other appointed non-executives, who also saw themselves as fulfilling 
the role of an informed member of the public.  
5.40 While the elections removed the Scottish Government and OCPAS from the 
selection process, the alternative pilots retained this element of selection. This 
means that the distinctive appointments process remained, possibly making 
some applicants uncomfortable. It also meant that while applicants were 
somewhat different, the appointments process remained the same except for 
the lack of specific skills as an objective in recruitment.  
5.41 It is important to stress that the scale of the intervention in the boards with 
election pilots was greater than the scale of the intervention in the boards with 
alternative pilots. In both Grampian and Lothian, the pilot involved two non-
executive directors on established, large, boards. In Dumfries and Galloway 
and Fife, the elections pilots changed half the board. It is to be expected that 
even without elections, such turnover might affect a board.  
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6 SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
 
6.1 In the course of our research, many respondents made suggestions for 
improving on the pilots. We also had ideas of our own based on our 
experience and reading of the relevant literature. In this section we bring 
together, and offer a preliminary assessment of, suggestions that came up 
repeatedly. The majority of these relate to the electoral pilots. However this 
simply reflects the relative complexity and scale of change involved in the 
electoral (as opposed to appointed) pilots and does not imply a 
recommendation. The summary chapter that follows provides a balanced view 
of the advantages and disadvantages of each system.  
Electoral pilots 
6.2 We uncovered evidence that many voters found the number of candidates 
overwhelming. There was considerable concern that electors were either 
abstaining because they could not process so much information or were 
choosing candidates solely because they were already familiar with them, 
because they lived in the same area as the elector, or because their 
credentials were instantly obvious on a very superficial scan of the ballot 
paper. This may have disadvantaged some candidates and advantaged 
others. Many suggested that any future elections electors should be faced 
with fewer candidates. 
6.3 This suggestion is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, any barriers 
erected to reduce the number of candidates would need to be equitable. 
Secondly, because it is difficult to predict the likely number of candidates in 
advance, the risk of having an unmanageable number of candidates needs to 
be balanced against the competing possibility of having too few candidates to 
offer voters a meaningful choice. When health board elections have been 
introduced abroad (as discussed in the attached literature review, and as 
seen in National Parks Scotland) there has been a general trend for the 
numbers of candidates to fall over time. This suggests that the numbers of 
candidates would decline naturally after any rollout. On the other hand, the 
possibility of having an overwhelming number of candidates if elections were 
held under the same rules as the pilot in the larger Health Boards is serious.  
6.4 One potential solution that came up repeatedly was to divide Board areas into 
smaller ‘wards’ within which candidates would compete. For example, the 
NHS Fife area is currently composed of three Community Health Partnership 
(CHP) areas, and each of these could be treated as a separate ward20
                                            
20 Dumfries and Galloway contains only one, very large, CHP. 
. 
However, dividing the Health Board areas into separate wards could have 
ramifications for the Boards’ governance arrangements and perceptions of 
corporate responsibility. If some members were seen as having been elected 
by particular parts of the Board area, they could well perceive themselves to 
have a greater responsibility to the area that elected them. There would be a 
tension between such sentiment and their responsibility according to current 
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the Code of Corporate Governance to act in the interests of the population of 
Fife as a whole.   
6.5 The timing of the elections was not ideal. We understand that the Health 
Board elections were so close to the General Election because of a 
coincidence that was beyond Scottish Government or Health Boards’ control, 
but that coincidence probably reduced the impact of the publicity campaigns 
and contributed to low public awareness. However, this problem is unlikely to 
arise again. As the UK Government has now moved to fixed-term Parliaments 
the Scottish Government should usually have ample advance notice of a 
General Election. 
6.6 In our focus groups with young electors, several participants independently 
suggested that candidate photographs on the ballot papers or candidate 
statements would make the materials more appealing. Voters would 
presumably have a greater chance of recognising familiar candidates. The 
issue of how photographs on ballot papers affect voter behaviour has been 
examined by academics before and there is some evidence that photographs 
on ballot papers give an electoral advantage to certain demographic groups, 
such as younger candidates21
6.7 Ballot papers and booklets of statements listed candidates in alphabetical 
order by surname. A few respondents did suggest the possibility that 
candidates whose surnames gave them prominent positions on the ballot and 
among the statements gained an unfair advantage.  There is some academic 
research on the effects of name order on election performance, which does 
tend to suggest that some positions on a ballot paper offer a modest 
advantage
.  
22
6.8 There was some misunderstanding of the rules of the election. For example, 
we came across a few instances of voters and candidates who believed that 
they could only vote for ten (rank-ordered) candidates in Dumfries and 
Galloway and twelve in Fife because those were the numbers of seats 
available, rather than being able to rank-order all candidates if they wished. It 
is difficult for us to get a sense of how common such misunderstandings were 
and why they arose; it is possible that they always arise with STV elections 
and that we would find the same confusion in local government elections.  
. There are clearly many factors that attract voters to candidates, 
and these modest effects would probably not be enough on their own to elect 
candidates who did not win support for other reasons. It is important to 
remember that the elections referred to in the literature would not have 
involved such a large number of candidates and would have involved party 
labels, which are known to be an important cue for voters.  It is not feasible for 
us to estimate how much of an impact name order may have had, but to 
dispel any doubt we suggest that it may be worthwhile to randomise name 
order on the ballot papers and candidate statements in any future elections. 
This would have cost implications. 
                                            
21 See, for example, Johns and Shephard (2011) ‘Electoral Impact of Ballot Photographs’ in Political 
Studies 59(3) pp636-658  
22 See for example Miller and Krosnick (1998) ‘The Impact of Candidate Name Order on Electoral 
Outcomes’ in the Public Opinion Quarterly 62(3) pp291-330  
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6.9 Voters appeared to have very little information about the role of non-
executives on NHS Boards. Presenting electors with a brief introductory 
statement on the context of the election as well as the rules might help to 
disperse this information. Electors needed to be informed about the election 
either on the day their ballot papers arrived or beforehand as there were 
reports of some disposing of their papers on the day they arrived if they were 
unaware of the contest. Given the large volume of information being delivered 
to electors during the General Election campaign in April and May, information 
may not have been picked up; providing some alongside the ballot could 
reduce this. 
6.10 A few candidates had reservations about their home addresses being printed 
on ballot papers. Some had held sensitive positions in the past and were 
concerned at being approached by former acquaintances. As far as we are 
aware there was no mechanism in place for candidates to stand without 
advertising their addresses. For example, candidates who had held judicial 
appointments, sensitive child protection roles, or who had previously been 
subject to harassment, may have legitimate grounds for wishing to conceal 
their address. We suggest such a mechanism be put in place in the event of a 
rollout. 
6.11 One candidate complained that a statement had been printed incomplete, with 
a second paragraph missing. Ideally, candidates would be given an 
opportunity to see proofs of their statements before these were delivered to 
printers.  
6.12 There were some minor practical issues around electoral registration. For 
example, the electoral registration rules obliged Returning Officers to send 
electors' voting packs to the addresses listed for them on the 1st of April 2010 
register. This meant that *some* electors who moved to a new address 
between the cut-off date for this register (in early March) and the 10th of May 
*needed to specifically request that their ballots be sent to their new address, 
which would have been very inconvenient*.  While a few electors inevitably 
find themselves in this situation at any election, the numbers might have been 
minimised had Registration Officers been able to use a more recent register. 
Similarly, the rules only allowed replacement ballot papers to be issued to 
electors who claimed they had not received a voting pack, or who claimed 
they had inadvertently spoiled the paper but could not produce evidence, 
within seven days of the voting deadline. Those electors had to wait *until the 
3rd of June for their request for a new ballot to be acted on, even if this was 
reported in mid-May* and Returning Officers had no discretion to issue a new 
paper earlier. There may be an argument for relaxing the wording. We would 
recommend that the Scottish Government confer with Electoral Registration 
Officers on such issues if elections are rolled out across Scotland. 
Appointment process 
6.13 Recruitment and selection for the appointments took longer than initially 
envisaged, largely due to the unprecedented numbers of applications 
received, and this delayed the process considerably. As a result, some of the 
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new members did not join the alternative pilot Boards until November 2010. 
Ideally, systems would be put in place to speed the process. 
6.14 There were some delays in getting feedback to applicants for the appointed 
pilots. Again, this was linked to the unusually high number of applicants. While 
the high level of interest generated may be an encouraging sign, if this were 
repeated in any rollout it would be beneficial if the Scottish Government were 
to slightly increase the resources devoted to administrative support of the 
selection process. This should allow officials to process applications at normal 
speeds despite a substantially increased workload. 
6.15 It is worth noting that the alternative pilots altered the application process only 
up to the point at which applicants submitted their forms. From that point on, 
the Scottish Government Public Appointments Unit and the Office of the 
Commissioner for Public Appointments in Scotland (OCPAS) ran a 
conventional selection process. We were not instructed to evaluate any 
changes to the selection process beyond those made by the Health Boards as 
part of the pilot, so we are not in a position to say whether changes to the 
selection process might help to meet the Scottish Government’s policy 
objectives. If encouraging greater diversity in the backgrounds of Non-
Executive Directors of Health Boards is a policy objective, then there may well 
be scope for further study to find out how the selection process could enhance 
diversity. 
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7 CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY  
 
7.1 In order to help Ministers and the Parliament to reach a way forward, this 
section lays out, in concise form, the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
each model based on the research reported here and the accompanying 
literature review. This section could usefully be read in conjunction with the 
executive summary. When comparing relative impact, it should be noted that 
the election pilots replaced approximately half of the membership of those two 
boards, while the alternative pilots involved many fewer non-executives 
relative to the size of the boards.  
Current system 
7.2 Strengths of the current system are that: 
• it allows recruitment by skills (e.g. advertising for a candidate with specific 
expertise in finance);  
• selects candidates who are primarily committed to a fiduciary role (i.e. who 
are seen and see themselves as trustees rather than representatives, 
delegates, or advocates);  
• and it is well understood by the NHS, politicians, civil servants and the 
interested public.  
 
7.3 Weaknesses of the current system include: 
•  its perceived democratic deficit  
•  and board demographics that are not wholly statistically representative of 
the general population.  
 
Alternative pilots: Public Partnership Forum (PPF) recruitment 
7.4 The strengths of the PPF recruitment model used in Lothian are: 
• its very low cost;  
• that it draws on a population with a demonstrated knowledge of and interest 
in the health board;  
• and in common with other models it led to more accessible board papers  
 
7.5 The weaknesses of the PPF recruitment model are:  
• loss of the opportunity to use specific skill-based recruitment (e.g. recruiting 
specifically for financial expertise); 
• the risk that it will duplicate existing board information flows;  
• limited diversity compared to elections due to the use of the existing public 
appointments process; 
• and limited diversity compared to elections due to the limitation of 
recruitment to existing PPF members, who are not necessarily statistically 
representative of the general population. 
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Alternative pilots: Wider advertising 
7.6 The strengths of the wider advertising strategy used in Grampian and Lothian 
are that: 
• its costs are much lower than those of elections;  
• that it increases the diversity of the applicant pool;  
• and that it creates the opportunity to raise the profile of the board and 
highlight opportunities for engagement other than board membership.  
 
7.7 The weaknesses of the wider advertising strategy are: 
• limitation of skill-based recruitment, as criteria are relaxed to encourage a 
wider range of applicants; 
• and that the diversity of the actual candidates chosen for the board can be 
limited by the use of the existing public appointments process.  
 
Elections 
7.8 The strengths of the elections include: 
• the creation of a new vehicle for boards to link to the general public;  
• the creation of a new vehicle for the public to participate;  
• more diversity of views about the NHS present on the board (e.g. candidates 
affiliated with specific hospitals were elected);  
• an enhanced degree of challenge (e.g. recorded votes were taken, and 
elected directors sought to have their contributions recorded by name);  
• increased attention to the role of the non-executives as a result of the need 
to induct a large number of new and diverse members; 
• more approachable board papers, something not confined to the election 
pilot boards. 
 
7.9 The weaknesses of the elections include: 
• limited demographic broadening relative to the general population;  
• limited use by boards as a way to find out about community preferences (no 
board eliminated any existing public and patient involvement mechanism 
that might have been considered duplicative after the elections);  
• limited use by the public as a vehicle to influence boards (turnout, in the 
Scottish Board elections and the ones reviewed around the world, was 
relatively low);  
• the financial cost of running the elections, which could be higher per-voter if 
rolled out across Scotland; 
• the organisational cost of inducting a large number of new people, defining 
board member roles, investing heavily in board development, and diverting 
time of all concerned, but especially the Executive Directors and Chairs, 
towards board management;  
• and the loss of the opportunity to engage in skill-based recruitment.  
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